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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 05-4801
________________
MICHAEL DAVIS,
                     Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DR. MARIE TYRGOVAC;
 TROY WILLIAMSON, WARDEN, USP ALLENWOOD;
 S. CONFAIR; R. DIVERS; S. MITCHELL; TODD CERNEY
________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-02284)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
April 27, 2006
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 1, 2006)
________________
 OPINION
________________
PER CURIAM
Michael Davis appeals from the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.  In his Bivens action, Davis alleges that officials at
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over1
the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment.  See Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d
141, 145 (3d Cir. 2002).  Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine
issue of material fact.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.  A genuine issue of material fact exists only
where a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party in light of the evidence
presented.  See Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693-94 (3d Cir. 1988).  We review the
facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered,
and where the parties’ evidence is in conflict, we accept the non-movant’s as true.  See
Pastore v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).
2
the United States Penitentiary-Allenwood retaliated against him for taking legal or
administrative action against a program coordinator at the prison.  Specifically, Davis
contends that the defendants planted a seven-inch sharpened metal rod in his locked
locker (located within his two-person cell) and charged him with possession,
manufacture, or introduction of a weapon.  Davis also claims that his right to due process
was violated during the subsequent disciplinary hearing and resulting sentence of 60 days
in disciplinary segregation.
In response to the complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment.  The District Court entered summary
judgment in the defendants’ favor; this timely appeal followed.   Because the appeal1
lacks arguable merit, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To prove retaliation, a prisoner must demonstrate 1) that he engaged in
constitutionally-protected conduct, 2) an adverse action by prison officials, sufficient to
deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and 3) a
causal link between the exercise of the rights and the adverse action taken against him. 
3See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003).  In granting summary judgment,
the District Court concluded that because Davis was not prevented from pursuing this
suit or administratively exhausting his claims, any adverse action failed the deterrence
prong.  The District Court also found Davis’ evidence of a causal link lacking.  
We agree that Davis’ retaliation claim fails, but for different reasons.  Though his
allegations are not precisely clear, Davis claims either that prison officials planted a
seven-inch knife-like metal rod in his locker, or that officials legitimately found a pair of
gloves and a metal sardine can top (prohibited items), and later changed the paperwork to
make it look as if they had found the knife.  We find no credible evidence to support
either claim.  Davis provides no support for his assertion that the defendants deliberately
destroyed a surveillance tape that would show that the weapon was not legitimately
discovered.  Instead, the evidence shows that by the time the appropriate staff member
was contacted nearly two months after the incident, the tape was recorded over as part of
a regular practice of recycling surveillance tapes after a certain amount of time has
passed.  There is also evidence, not addressed by Davis, that even if it existed, the tape
would not be fruitful because the surveillance system does not record activity inside the
cell.  Davis’ allegation that the weapon that prison officials planted was one previously
seized from another inmate is refuted by the disciplinary hearing officer’s specific
finding that the two weapons are not similar.  Davis offers no evidence to support his
assertion that the disciplinary report documenting the event originally charged him with
possession of an unauthorized item, but was then changed to the more serious weapon
4charge.  Finally, Davis’ allegations regarding time discrepancies in reports documenting
the events do not support his larger planted-weapon claim.  For these reasons, we
conclude that Davis has not shown adverse action by prison officials.    
With regard to the due process claim, Davis’ procedural due process rights are
triggered by deprivation of a legally cognizable liberty interest.  See Mitchell, 318 F.3d at
531.  If Davis has no protected liberty interest in remaining free of disciplinary custody,
then the Fourteenth Amendment does not obligate the state to provide him with process. 
Id.  Here, the District Court concluded that because Davis’ sanction did not include the
loss of good conduct time, he did not possess a liberty interest, and accordingly, was not
entitled to due process rights.  
Though we agree with the conclusion, the analysis is incomplete.  Though the
Supreme Court has found that the loss of good time credits entitles prisoners to
appropriate due process, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974), the
question of whether a sanction implicates a liberty interest is not answered by looking at
good time credits alone.  A liberty interest may also be present where a punishment
entails an “atypical and significant hardship.”  Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 532 (citation
omitted).  Courts are required to look into this possibility.  See id. at 533 n.6.  In order to
do so, a court should perform a fact-specific inquiry evaluating “the duration of
disciplinary confinement and the conditions of that confinement in relation to other
prison conditions.”  Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
Applying these criteria, we conclude that Davis has not shown that he had a liberty
5interest at stake.  He has provided no evidence that the conditions during his 60 days of
disciplinary segregation involved atypical or significant hardship.  Contra id. at 528, 533
(“deplorable” conditions of prisoner’s cell in restricted housing unit included human
waste smeared on the walls, infestation by insects, and nightly kicking and banging on
the walls by other inmates).  In addition, this Court has found several times that
restrictive confinement for a much longer period than that imposed upon Davis does not
implicate the prisoner’s liberty interests.  See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 645,
654 (3d Cir. 2002) (seven months disciplinary confinement); Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d
141, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2002) (disciplinary detention for fifteen days and administrative
segregation for 120 days); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-09 (3d Cir. 1997)
(fifteen months administrative detention).  Davis offers no other reason why the sanction
against him meets the standard.
In sum, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Davis’ claims. 
Because this appeal lacks merit, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
